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Abstract: 
We document significant and robust empirical relationships in cross-country panel data 
between government size or social expenditure on the one hand, and trade and financial 
development indicators on the other. Across countries, deeper economic integration is 
associated with more intense government redistribution, but more developed financial markets 
weaken that relationship. Over time, controlling for country-specific effects, public social 
expenditure appears to be eroded by globalization trends where financial market development 
can more easily substitute for it.  
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 1. Introduction
This paper brings two simple theoretical insights to bear on cross-country panel data. The 
first is that individual welfare depends importantly on the possibility to shelter 
consumption from labour market and health risks, but financial markets are not always so 
well developed as to allow households to do so effectively. Thus, policies and institutions 
buffer the impact of labour demand shocks on wages and employment, and taxes and 
subsidies further decouple household incomes from market outcomes. Such institutions 
are also expected to be shaped by a second set of theoretical considerations, concerning 
international integration of economic activity. The risks entailed by international trade 
and specialization may make government policies’ income redistribution role more 
important. At the same time, however, economic integration makes it more difficult and 
expensive to implement such policies: international competition increases the relevance 
of cost competitiveness, makes it difficult to operate social protection schemes based on 
youth education and lifelong employment, and challenges governments’ taxation powers 
(Sinn, 2003). 
Our empirical analysis, based on these insights, builds upon recent studies of the 
relationship between international economic integration and governments’ interference 
with free market outcomes. Over the last 100 years, openness to international trade and 
within-country income inequality have followed very similar U-shapes (Atkinson and 
Piketty, 2007). While direct links between the two are difficult to detect empirically 
(OECD, 2007), there is strong and robust survey evidence that attitudes towards 
economic integration are driven by income distribution implications (Mayda, O’Rourke, 
and Sinnott, 2007), and that exposure to international competition through foreign direct 
investment increases perceived job insecurity (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). Empirically, 
more open countries engage in more pervasive interference with market-driven income 
distribution processes in the data analysed by Rodrik (1998), Agell (2002), and others.
The theoretical considerations introduced above suggest that the relationship between 
economic integration and government policies should depend on the extent to which 
2private contracts can, through formal insurance or self-insurance, make policy less 
necessary for consumption-smoothing purposes. International competition makes it 
difficult for governments to meet demand for protection from risk, and makes it 
increasingly important for households to access private financial markets. Our analysis of 
cross-country differences and country-specific trajectories in a panel dataset of 
government policy, financial development, and openness indicators aims at detecting 
such empirical patterns.  
In the data we analyse,  international economic integration tends to be accompanied in 
cross-section by larger government budgets and more intense redistribution, and also 
tends to be associated with stronger financial market development. Financial 
development interacts significantly with openness in explaining the intensity of 
governments’ interference with market outcomes, indicating that different income and 
consumption-smoothing schemes do substitute each other in addressing the insurance 
needs generated by increasing openness. Over time, controlling for country-specific 
characteristics, increasing openness tends to reduce government redistribution, and does 
so more strongly in countries with better private financial markets. 
2. Governments and openness 
We begin, following Rodrik (1998), by inspecting the association in our data between 
openness and government’s involvement with income distribution. We run regressions in 
the form 
u Z Openness G      M E D                                             (1)
where the dependent variable is an indicator of the State’s involvement in resource 
redistribution: either the government share of GDP from the Penn World Tables, a broad 
measure available for a very wide set of countries, or more direct measures of social 
policy expenditures, available only for some OECD countries (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix for a list of the countries included in the two samples).  
3We are interested in empirical relationships between openness as a source of ongoing 
risk, and spending as a result of policy choices, rather than in the cyclical behaviour of 
import, exports, and government expenditures within a given structural and policy 
framework. To reduce the relevance of cyclical fluctuations, we average yearly 
observations. The timing and length of periods over which averages are computed make 
very little difference to the results: in our preferred specifications, averages (of logs) are 
taken over 5-year intervals and, since lagging driving processes reduces endogeneity 
concerns, openness is measured on the basis of the previous period’s average values. As 
yearly data are available between 1980 and 2003 for most variables and most countries, 
we can construct four 5-year periods, and a fifth covering the 2000-2003 four-year 
interval. We focus on the balanced panel of countries for which observations are 
available in all those five periods.  Results are very similar if observations available only 
for some countries are included in specific periods. 
Table 1 reports regressions of government policy variables on openness measured as the 
log of the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, averaged over the 10 years previous to 
the beginning of each 5-year sub-period. As to control variables,  M it Z  in (1), we have 
experimented with inclusion of the log of per capita GDP at the end of previous sub-
period, drawn from the Penn World Tables dataset, and with World Bank area dummies.
1
As the empirical evidence is not materially affected by these control variables, we discuss 
but do not report these results. 
Like Rodrik (1998), and over a longer range of periods, we find in Table 1 that the cross-
sectional association between openness and government’s share of GDP is positive and 
1 The dummies refer to the following groups of countries: High Income, Europe and Central Asia, 
East Asia, South Asia and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Latin 
America and Caribbean. From a theoretical point of view GDP per capita and country dummies 
may suitably summarize many country-specific and time-varying exogenous factors, including 
cyclical conditions and at least some demographic influences (in our preferred specification, 
pension expenditure is not included in the social policy indicator). Specification searches on more 
extensive sets of covariates would be in danger of detecting spurious rather than structural 
relationships.
4strong when all countries are considered. The coefficients are very similar across periods; 
a formal test does not reject the hypothesis that they are the same. In regressions not 
reported we find the results robust to inclusion of GDP per capita, which after controlling 
for openness has a negative coefficient as an explanatory variable for government 
expenditure. The relationship between openness and the share of government in GDP is 
also positive (if somewhat less significant, especially in the 1995-2003 period) when the 
sample is restricted to the OECD countries with information about social policy. The 
information in the data, especially those of the more recent cross sections, is not 
sufficient to provide precise estimates in such a small sample. In fact, as in Rodrik’s 
results, controlling for European location suffices to eliminate most of the relevant 
variation. Including GDP per capita does not change these findings.
For OECD countries, we also report in part C of Table 1 regressions documenting the 
association between openness and social policy, measured as a share of GDP, excluding 
old age pensions from the Public Social Expenditure OECD database available for the 
1980-2003 period on a yearly basis.
2 This relationship is positive in all cross-sections and 
strongly significant in the early ones. Interestingly, the strength of the relationship 
declines over time across the last four columns of the table.
3
This pattern may be driven by a variable that differs across countries and becomes less 
heterogeneous over time. Since private financial contracts can theoretically substitute 
government policies in buffering the distributional implications of international trade 
shocks, indicators of financial development are plausible candidates to play that role. 
2 We exclude old age and survivor pensions because pension schemes have very different 
redistributive character across countries. We also expect pension expenditures to be only loosely 
related (e.g. through early retirement policies) to international trade shocks. Indeed, the regression 
specifications reported below have uniformly lower explanatory power for indicators of social 
policy that include pensions. 
3 A formal test rejects the hypothesis that coefficients are the same in these cross-sections at a 
13.6% confidence level. The coefficients of openness in regressions that include GDP also feature 
a statistically significant positive correlation between openness and government expenditure; the 
coefficient of GDP is positive, possibly reflecting the bias towards social policies of government 
expenditure in richer countries.
5Before assessing their empirical relevance in the next section, where we run panel 
regressions with interaction coefficients, we need to discuss whether the pattern detected  
by the repeated cross-section results may be driven by misspecification.  
If the effect of openness were itself nonlinear, and stronger when openness increases 
along with financial development, the interaction effects would spuriously pick up that 
nonlinearity. Including the square of openness among the explanatory variables of the 
specifications reported in Table 1 returns a positive coefficient only for that reported in 
Panel A; this motivates us to check, in the regressions reported below, whether inclusion 
of the squared openness variable changes the estimated coefficients of interaction terms. 
In the OECD sample regressions reported in Panels B and C, the squared openness 
regression coefficient is actually negative (and not significant in most cases): this 
indicates that misspecification is not the source of nonlinear effects, and fosters 
confidence in the economic interpretation of financial development interactions. 
3. Finance and redistribution in opening economies 
Access to financial instruments makes it less necessary to rely on government 
redistribution in order to smooth consumption in the face of individual-specific shocks 
(Bertola and Koeniger, 2007). Countries are heterogeneous in the effectiveness of their 
legal and administrative frameworks in supporting markets and administrations, and a 
large body of work views market development and regulatory interferences as determined 
by countries’ “legal traditions” shaping patterns of substitutability across public and 
private approaches to income distribution (see La Porta et al., 1998, and other references 
in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007). While the flexible Common Law system of 
Anglo-Saxon countries appears more suitable to support private contractual relationships, 
the code-based systems of Continental European and other countries influenced by the 
French legal tradition seem to stifle development of private markets, while perhaps 
fostering relatively efficient bureaucratic administration of government schemes.  
6To assess the relevance of these insights in the datasets analysed in the previous section, 
we specify models relating openness to indicators of financial development. First, we run 
regressions in the form  
u Z Openness Fin      M E D                                         (2) 
where the indicators of government involvement considered by (1) are replaced as 
dependent variable by indicators of financial development, drawn from the World Bank’s 
Financial Structure Dataset, as documented in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001). 
We report in Table 2 regression results for a volume measure, Private Credit by Deposit 
Money Banks as a share of GDP (in logs), or a price measure, the Net Interest Margin 
(the difference between lending and borrowing rates at commercial banks). Both 
variables are defined in terms of yearly observations at the beginning of each sub-period; 
see the Appendix for more detailed definitions of these and all other variables. 
The pattern of the results shown in Table 2 is broadly similar to that of other regression 
we have run with different variables, different timing of observations, and simple controls 
in the form M Z : more open countries feature larger financial market volumes, and smaller 
interest rate spreads. As shown in set of cross-section results in Table 2, the bivariate 
relationship between openness and credit is strongly positive; the coefficients are found 
to be insignificantly different by formal tests. Inclusion of GDP per capita, in regressions 
not shown, absorbs a large portion of the relevant variation leaving an insignificant 
coefficient to openness as a determinant of credit volume; results are similar if openness 
and GDP are measured on a contemporaneous rather than lagged basis. Even less 
information is contained in the fewer and noisier observation of interest margins, but the 
regressions reported in part B of Table 2 estimate a negative (insignificant) coefficient, 
confirming that more openness to international trade is associated not only with higher 
volumes but also with better (to the limited extent that it may be observable) efficiency of 
financial markets. 
Next, we assess whether in countries with more developed financial markets the pressure 
to increase government involvement in response to a greater exposure to international 
7competition is lower. To this end we explore the co-variation between openness, 
government expenditure, and financial market development running regressions in the 
form 
 u Z FinStruct Openness FinStruct Openness G        M G J E D *                 (3) 
where the credit and price indicators used in (2) are replaced by more suitable indicators 
of financial market structure, namely: the World Bank’s credit information index 
(available for many countries, but only on an essentially cross-sectional basis - we 
average the 2005 and 2006 observations); and the maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) 
for mortgages (see the Appendix for more details on data sources).  
Part A of Table 3 reports regressions in the form (3) that estimate how openness and the 
credit information index perform as explanatory variables of government’s share of GDP. 
The main effect of openness is positive and significant; more interestingly, the interaction 
term between openness and the indicator of financial market structure is negative.
4 Since 
the credit information index is measured only in 2005 and 2006, the interaction 
coefficients are imprecisely estimated, and not significantly different from zero, in the 
earlier periods. This proxy of financial market structure ranges between 1 and 6, hence 
the impact of openness on government spending, as estimated by the interacted slope 
coefficient FinStruct G E  , spans both sides of the point estimate in the broad sample 
analysed in part A of Table 1. The range of variation of the index is much smaller across 
the OECD countries, where it reaches the lower bound at 3.5. Regressions (not reported) 
indicate that the interaction effect is by far less significant when estimated on the OECD 
subsample of these data. This may indicate that the features captured by differences of 
credit infrastructure across developed countries are less relevant to our perspective than 
those observed in the broader sample: intuitively, differences across OECD countries are 
smaller than those across less developed countries and, especially, those between the two 
groups of countries.
4 Interactions with financial development indicators remains negative, if less significant, if the 
square of openness is included in the panel version of that regression.
8More precise and relevant information is available for the OECD sample not only as 
regards the redistribution role of the government, in the form of public social expenditure 
as a share of GDP introduced and analysed above, but also as regards households’ access 
to financial instruments, in the form of loan-to-value ratios on housing mortgages. In part 
B of Table 3 we find that, without controls, the interaction between LTV and openness as 
explanatory variables for public social expenditure is negative in more recent years. 
Including GDP as a control explains a large portion of the variation in social spending as 
a fraction of GDP, and the interaction between LTV and openness, while still negative in 
more recent years, becomes less significant. 
Of course, these results’ interpretation is not straightforward: since GDP is not a 
completely exogenous variable, its impact on the results reflects possible causal 
relationships between GDP per capita and social spending. From the statistical point of 
view, however, the declining pattern over time of the openness’ slope coefficients in the 
cross-country regressions of Table 1 is interestingly accounted for by increasingly easy 
financial market access (across OECD countries, the average LTV was about 75 in the 
1980s, and about 90 in the 2000s). These regressions also pick up differences in the paths 
followed by different countries: while in the 1980s Anglo-Saxon members of the OECD 
such as the UK and the US already featured LTV ratios greater than 80%, countries such 
as Italy only converged to such values in the late 1990s, starting from LTV ratios as low 
as 56% in the earlier periods of the sample.
The relevance of time-series trajectories in these regressions begs more general questions 
regarding country-specific evolutions and reforms. To assess the extent to which LTV 
variation accounts for the heterogeneity of estimated coefficients, the next section reports 
results of panel estimations that constrain coefficients to be the same across all 
observations and control for country-specific effects.
94. Dynamics and reforms 
The results reported so far establish that globalization tends to be associated with larger 
governments across countries, but also that this association is less pronounced across 
developed countries, where it tends to become shallower over time and more strongly so 
where financial markets are better developed. It is not easy to interpret these and other 
patterns observed in the data in structural terms, because deeper unobservable variables 
may determine both government expenditure and the components of openness and 
financial market structure that reflect policies.  
To the extent that historical and geographical factors driving country experiences are 
stable over time within the sample period, however, it is possible to account for them in 
terms of country-specific intercept effects. Bertola (2007) reports that, in panel 
regressions on yearly data with country dummies, the estimates suggest that more 
openness is associated with less generous social expenditure, and that the relationship is 
stronger in countries where financial markets are more developed. This may indicate that, 
within each country, additional demand for socially provided insurance is more than 
offset by increasingly difficult supply of social protection in conditions of intense 
international competition. However, the negative association between openness and 
social policy detected by regressions with country dummies (hence over time for a given 
country) may well reflect cyclical rather than structural slow-moving mechanisms.
5
The period-averaged data used in the present paper makes it possible to smooth out 
cyclical factors, as well as to control for country-specific effects so as to focus on 
dynamic relationships. For most of the variables in our regressions it is also possible to 
construct such averages over a longer time-span than in Rodrik (1998) and Bertola 
(2007). Thus, we run regressions of government policy indicators on the previous sub-
5 In the annual dataset used in that paper, in fact, allowing for country specific trends as well as 
intercepts returns a negative coefficient for openness as an explanatory variable of social policy. 
To the extent that trends capture deterministic differences of country growth, this indicates that in 
annual data cyclical fluctuations tend (in this sample) to produce a negative association between  
social expenditures (in a given policy framework) and measured openness.  
10period’s  averages of openness (in logs) and of financial market indicators, again 
checking whether results are robust to inclusion of such controls as real GDP per capita 
and regional dummies. Our panel analysis can exploit information on the 1980-2003 time 
span, divided in 5 sub-periods, and regresses each sub-period’s average of indicators of 
government involvement on openness and financial market indicators computed as mean 
values over the previous five years. 
In regressions on the Penn World Tables sample, with the government share of GDP as 
dependent variable, a pooled panel specification yields a positive estimate for the 
interaction of openness and the volume of private credit (the credit information index, 
which would be a more suitable interaction variable, is only available for the last period). 
The interaction becomes negative when fixed effects are included, but remains 
insignificant, and the same specification returns negative interaction estimates when run 
on the OECD sample of countries. In what follows, we display and discuss in detail the 
similar, but more precise and interesting estimates produced by the social policy and LTV 
indicators available for the OECD sample of countries.  
In Table 4 we report pooled-OLS, random-effects, fixed-effects and first-difference 
estimates of the coefficients of regressions in the form of equations (3).
6 In the first 
column of Table 4, we find that the main effect of openness on social policy is positive 
and significantly different from zero in pooled panel estimates including interactions with 
LTV. Random-effects estimation leads to very similar results but fixed-effect estimation 
(third column of Table 4) reports a smaller main effect of openness, and the Hausman test 
indicates that accounting for country effects is necessary to obtain consistent estimates of 
the results of interest. The country-specific intercept estimates (not reported) control for 
permanent influences on social policy: unsurprisingly they are more positive for 
Scandinavian and Continental European countries than for Anglo-Saxon and 
Mediterranean countries, as well as for Japan. This is consistent with well-known features 
6 The results are not affected by inclusion of squared openness among the regressors. The various 
specifications aim at estimating (robustly to some unobserved heterogeneity) the same 
coefficients: thus, the interaction coefficient’s interpretation is the same as that outlined when 
discussing the functional form of equation (3).
11of the various countries’ reliance on formal Welfare State expenditures, rather than on 
regulatory instruments such as employment protection legislation, and with the different 
role of family support networks in different cultures (see for instance Esping-Andersen, 
1990, and the further discussion in Section 5 below).  
In Table 4, the main effect of openness as an explanatory variable for social policy is 
positive and significant, if less so in the first-difference estimator of the last column. As 
in Rodrik’s first-differenced specifications, where the interactions of interest were with 
terms of trade variability (see his Table 5, p.1018), the more interesting findings are those 
that relate openness to social policy after accounting for its interaction with the LTV 
financial development indicator. In the pooled estimates, the main effect is in the order of 
0.96, and the interaction coefficient in the order of  -0.008. To interpret these results, 
recall that the association between social policy and openness is measured 
by FinStruct G E   in the notation of equation (3). As the estimated value of G  is 
negative and the LTV ratio ranges between 50% and 105% across the (lagged and 
averaged) 5-year sub-periods in the sample,  the coefficient  FinStruct G E  that relates 
log openness to social policy ranges between one-half for the observations with the 
poorest financial market conditions, and zero for those with the easiest access to credit. 
As to significance, the interacted slope coefficient of openness is statistically different 
from zero with better than 10% confidence for values of LTV smaller than 100%. 
In the panel-data specifications of Table 4, the inclusion of fixed effects leaves the 
interaction point estimates essentially unaffected at about -0.009, and the fact that the 
main effect is estimated at zero implies that over time, for given country-specific 
characteristics, more openness is for all countries associated with less generous social 
policy. The interacted coefficient is statistically negative with more than 10% confidence 
for LTV values larger than about 96%. Results are qualitatively similar for the first-
differenced specification, where the interaction term has a lower coefficient. Inclusion of 
the controls variables mentioned when discussing previous tables leaves all these results 
unaffected.
125. Welfare State models and labour market regulation 
Our results indicate that increasing openness does tend to be associated with more 
government involvement (as in Rodrik’s seminal contribution), but only if financial 
markets are not well developed. Where they are, its main association is that with the 
financial market outcomes documented by the regressions in the form (3) reported in 
Table 3.
Since our analysis focuses on controls of labour-market risk, the social policy 
expenditure indicator used in the regressions above may be too broad to capture the 
relationships of interest between insurance-oriented public programmes, openness, and 
financial development. Experimenting with similar specifications on narrower definitions 
of social expenditure, such as the ratio to GDP of “Active Labour Market Programmes” 
and/or “Unemployment” expenditures in the OECD classification, does not yield 
particularly informative results. At this level of policy disaggregation, in fact, 
expenditures need not provide accurate information on the relevant characteristics of 
welfare systems as diverse as those that emerged from the historical development of 
Nation-States. In Continental European countries, institutions meant to endow workers 
with some bargaining power and to equalize their wages can play a role similar to that of 
income taxes and direct subsidies in restraining market forces and shaping individual 
incomes (Agell, 2002).  
Indicators are available from OECD sources for these and other insurance-oriented
institutions. Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) expenditures can and should 
be normalized by unemployment rates as well as by aggregate GDP levels, and the 
generosity of unemployment benefits can be sensibly normalized by previous wages, as 
in gross replacement rate (GRRs) indicators, and measured in terms of the length of time 
during which unemployment workers are entitled to benefits (UB duration). Also relevant 
and available are indicators for the tightness of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
and for aspects of wage-setting frameworks, such as the percentage of wage-earners who 
are members of a trade union (TU density) and the extent to which negotiations consider 
13the consequences of wage setting for the whole economy (Coordination). And marginal 
tax rates (Marginal tax rate), accounting for the percentage of additional earnings that is 
taxed away, measures a highly relevant aspect of  the tax system’s income stabilization 
effects.
7
Using these seven indicators, we revisit Agell’s (2002) specification of empirical 
relationships over time and across countries between labour market institutions and 
openness. In Table 5 we report regressions of indicators of labour market institutions on 
measures of openness and financial market development for 18 OECD countries. (In 
results are not reported, inclusion of controls such as GDP per capita does not affect 
estimates.) Interestingly, Part A of Table 5 shows that the correlation of openness with 
the three indicators of unemployment benefit systems is positive and strongly significant 
in pooled panel regressions, and the same is true for trade union density, coordination in 
wage bargaining, and for the marginal tax rate. The indicator of EPL is also related to 
openness, albeit more weakly. We have also estimated period-specific cross-sectional 
regressions. The coefficients of those regressions (not reported) are typically not 
significantly different from those of the pooled regressions.  
Again, aiming at detecting the relevance of financial market development as a substitute 
for policy measures, Part B of Table 5 reports regressions of labour market regulation 
indicators on main and interaction effects of openness and LTV. Significant and positive 
interactions in pooled OLS specifications are detected for ALMPs and Coordination. 
Interestingly, pooled OLS also estimates a negative and significant interaction effect for 
tax progressivity. In fixed effects specifications, the limited time variability of labour 
7 Data on institutional indicators are from the OECD and several authors (for detailed definitions 
and sources see the Appendix). Time series for labour market indicators have been compiled 
according to the following compilation strategy. Data have been interpolated when yearly 
observations were missing; for years before (after) the first (last) observation available in the 
subperiod, the value recorded in the first (last) year of observation has been assigned to all years 
since the start (or to the end) of the subperiod.  
14market institutions unsurprisingly makes it difficult to detect significant effects. Inclusion 
of GDP, which turns out to be almost always insignificant, does not affect these results. 
All in all, our exploration of more plentiful and precise data confirms the message of 
Agell’s (2002) estimates of bivariate relationships. The tightness of labour market 
regulation is positively, albeit weakly, related to openness, suggesting that race-to-the-
bottom tendencies are dominated by demand for stronger protection. In contrast to the 
regressions above on social policy expenditure indicators, little or no evidence is detected 
of a less positive relationship over time within country, or of significant interactions with 
financial market development, with the exception of the of marginal tax rate indicator. 
This may indicate that labour market institutions are less directly relevant than taxation 
and social spending to labour-income and consumption smoothing and, as they are more 
stable over time, perhaps less subject to race-to-the-bottom tendencies. Future work could 
fruitfully explore complementarities and substitutabilities between various institutional 
aspects of different countries’ labour markets. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Extending Rodrik’s (1998) analysis of the relationship between openness and government 
size to more numerous and recent periods, and to a more precise measure of public 
redistribution, we have documented that the association between openness and social 
spending is positive but has become shallower over time. Extending the specification to 
indicators of financial development, private financial markets appear to substitute for 
public redistribution along both cross-country and time series dimensions. 
In cross-section, not only public redistribution but also private financial market 
transactions tend to increase with international economic openness, addressing the need 
for consumption smoothing in the presence of international sources of income instability. 
Systematically different combinations of public schemes and private contracts are 
observed in countries characterized by different legal and social traditions. When 
country-specific intercepts control for such permanent differences, we find evidence of a 
15tendency for globalization to be associated with declining generosity of social spending 
within each country. The tendency is more pronounced in countries where well 
developed financial markets absorb a larger proportion of demand for consumption 
smoothing. As financial markets have become more uniformly well-developed in the 
OECD, this explains why, in cross-section, public social expenditure has become less 
positively associated with openness.  
Further work aimed at assessing the relative advantages and disadvantages of public and 
private schemes in different countries, and economic and political sustainability of 
economic integration trends, could explore the relevance of our theoretical perspective to 
income inequality. Bertola (2008) finds that the tighter integration between member 
countries of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union is associated with less generous 
social policies and, through that channel, higher income inequality. In broader samples of 
countries, indicators of economic integration are not tightly correlated to income 
inequality in theory and empirically, and the co-variation of income inequality and 
financial development is also ambiguously signed in the data (Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 
2003).  It would be interesting to see whether clearer results may be obtained accounting 
for the relationships, documented in the present paper, among these variables and 
government policies.  
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18DATA APPENDIX
The dataset includes the following variables. 
Openness: ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, variable openc, "Openness in Current Prices" 
from the Penn World Tables 6.2.
Government share of GDP: variable cg "Government Share of CGDP" from the Penn World 
Tables 6.2. 
Social expenditure: social policy expenditures as a share to GDP, variable built on data from the 
OECD Social Expenditure database (2007). The expenditure categories included are: 3. 
Incapacity Related Benefits; 4. Health; 5. Family; 6. Active Labour Market Programmes; 7. 
Unemployment; 8. Housing;  9. Other social policy areas. We exclude old age and survivor 
pensions (categories 1 and 2). 
Indicators of financial development. Indicators in Table 2 are drawn from the World Bank’s 
Financial Structure Dataset, as documented in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001); we use 
the January 17, 2007 revision. Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks as a share of GDP is the 
variable pcrdbgdp. Net Interest Margin is the variable netintmargin. The Credit information 
index is downloadable from the World Bank’s Doing Business website. It assigns a score of 1 for 
each of 6 features: (1) Both positive and negative credit information is distributed; (2) Data on 
both firms and individuals are distributed; (3) Data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as 
well as financial institutions are distributed; (4) More than 2 years of historical data are 
distributed; (5) Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed; (6) By law, 
borrowers have the right to access their data. See also Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). 
The time-varying indicator for Loan-to-Value ratios is built by interpolating data on maximum 
LTV ratios reported by the OECD Economic Study by Catte et al. (2004), Jappelli and Pagano 
(1994), and various sources adding information on countries not accounted for by the OECD (see 
Lo Prete, 2008). 
Labour Market Indicators. The Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) index is the 
amount of expenditures on ALMPs per unemployed person as a percentage of GDP per member 
of the labour force  (see Lo Prete, 2008). The duration of unemployment benefits (UB duration) 
measure is based on OECD data on the (monthly) "maximum benefit duration" of entitlement to 
unemployment insurance (see Lo Prete, 2008). Information on the other five labour market 
19institutions is drawn from the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set, compiled by LSE (September 
2006 release). Gross Replacement Rates (variable brr_oecd ) refer to the OECD series, built as 
the average of benefit replacement rates across the first five years of unemployment for three 
family situations and two money levels. The Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator 
(variable epl) measures the strictness of mandatory measures that regulate hiring and firing. 
Trade Union Density (variable udnet_vis) is computed as the percentage of wage-earners who are 
members of trade unions. The index of Coordination in wage bargaining ranges from 1 to 3 
(variable cowint). The measure of Marginal Tax Rates is computed as the un-weighted average 
of tax rates paid by a single person on the basis of “total tax payment less cash transfers” rates 
over four family types (variables sing1a, sing2a, sing3a, and sing4a in the CEP-OECD database). 
Control Variables. The GDP per capita variable is the Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita
from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (variable cgdp).
20Table A1. List of countries in the sample
1.Afghanistan
2.UnitedArabEmirates
3.Argentina
4.AntiguaandBarbuda
5.Australia*
6.Austria**
7.Burundi
8.Belgium**
9.Benin
10.BurkinaFaso
11.Bangladesh
12.Belize
13.Bolivia
14.Brazil
15.Bhutan
16.Botswana
17.CentralAfricanRepublic
18.Canada**
19.Switzerland*
20.Chile
21.China
22.Coted'Ivoire
23.Cameroon
24.Congo.Rep.
25.Colombi
26.Comoros
27.CapeVerde
28.CostaRica
29.Djibouti
30.Dominica
31.Denmark**
32.DominicanRepublic
33.Algeria
34.Ecuador
35.Egypt.ArabRep.
36.Spain**
37.Ethiopia
38.Finland**
39.Fiji
40.France**
41.Micronesia.Fed.Sts.
42.Gabon
43.UnitedKingdom**
44.Germany**
45.Ghana
46.Guinea
47.Gambia
48.GuineaͲBissau
49.Greece**
50.Grenada
51.Guatemala
52.Honduras
53.Haiti
54.Hungary
55.Indonesia
56.India
57.Ireland**
58.Iran,IslamicRep.
59.Iraq
60.Iceland
61.Israel
62.Italy**
63.Jamaica
64.Jordan
65.Japan**
66.Kenya
67.Cambodia
68.Kiribati
69.St.KittsandNevis
70.Korea.Rep.
71.Kuwait
72.LaoPDR
73.St.Lucia
74.SriLanka
75.Lesotho
76.Morocco
77.Madagascar
78.Maldives
79.Mexico
80.Mali
81.Mongolia
82.Mozambique
83.Mauritania
84.Mauritius
85.Malawi
86.Namibia
87.Niger
88.Nigeria
89.Nicaragua
90.Netherlands**
91.Norway**
92.Nepal
93.NewZealand*
94.Oman
95.Pakistan
96.Panama
97.Peru
98.Philippines
99.PapuaNewGuinea
100.Poland
101.PuertoRico
102.Portugal**
103.Paraguay
104.Romania
105.Rwanda
106.SaudiArabia
107.Sudan
108.Senegal
109.SolomonIslands
110.SierraLeone
111.ElSalvador
112.SaoTomeandPrincipe
113.Suriname
114.Sweden**
115.Swaziland
116.Seychelles
117.SyrianArabRepublic
118.Chad
119.Togo
120.Thailand
121.Tonga
122.TrinidadandTobago
123.Tunisia
124.Turkey
125.Taiwan
126.Tanzania
127.Uganda
128.Uruguay
129.UnitedStates**
130.St.VincentandtheGrenadines
131.Venezuela
132.Vanuatu
133.Samoa
134.SouthAfrica
135.Congo.Dem.Rep.
136.Zambia
137.Zimbabwe
Notes: * Countries in the 21-country OECD sample. ** Countries in the 18-country OECD sample.
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Table 1. Government Policy and Openness: Cross-Sections 
A. Dependent  variable: Log of Government Share of GDP: All countries 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
 Log Openness  0.1724  0.1901  0.1887  0.2341  0.2128
 2.98  2.88  2.87  3.38  2.62
 Constant  2.3430  2.2532  2.2721  2.0523  2.1339
10.16  8.26  8.51  7.32  6.31
 Number of obs.  137 137 137 137 137
 R
2  0.0626  0.0670  0.0646  0.0858  0.0504
B. Dependent variable: Log of Government Share of GDP: OECD countries 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
 Log Openness      0.2180      0.2035      0.1866      0.1584      0.1134
       3.34        3.27        2.44        1.74        1.10
 Constant      2.0250      2.0287      2.1068      2.1814      2.3601
       9.52        9.42        7.59        6.43        5.88
 Number of obs.  21 21 21 21 21
 R
2      0.1429      0.1298      0.1146      0.0871      0.0464
C. Dependent variable: Log of Social Expenditure 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
 Log Openness      0.4451      0.4956      0.3799      0.3075      0.2603
       5.46        7.00        3.80        3.47        2.87
 Constant      0.6803      0.4905      1.0471      1.3485      1.5243
       2.28        1.71        2.61        3.84        4.24
 Number of obs.  21 21 21 21 21
 R
2      0.4030      0.4439      0.2888      0.2911      0.2881
Notes: Robust t-statistic in italics. Table 2. Private Credit (Volume), Net Interest Margin and Openness: Cross-Sections
A. Dependent variable: Log of Private Credit (Volume) 
Log of 
Private
Credit,1980
Log of 
Private
Credit,1985
Log of 
Private
Credit,1990
Log of 
Private
Credit,1995
Log of 
Private
Credit,2000
 Log Openness  0.1084  0.2315  0.2025  0.2995  0.4240
 0.76  1.33  1.08  1.29  1.68
 Constant -1.8204 -2.2338 -2.0574 -2.4918 -2.8812
-2.98 -2.97 -2.61 -2.52 -2.61
Number of obs.  93 93 93 93 93
 R
2  0.0060  0.0223  0.0140  0.0204  0.0386
B. Dependent variable: Net Interest Margin 
Net Interest 
Margin 1995 
Net Interest 
Margin 2000
 Log Openness -0.0073 -0.0096
-1.14 -1.47
 Constant  0.0837  0.0913
 3.11  3.22
Number of obs.  94 94
 R
2  0.0130  0.0203
Notes: Robust t-statistic in italics. 
2324
Table 3. Government Policy, Openness and Financial Market Indicators: Cross-
sections
A. Dependent variable: Log of Government Share of GDP, All countries 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
 Log Openness  0.1958  0.2361  0.2490  0.3464  0.3447
 2.04  2.22  2.59  3.25  2.66
 CredInfo  0.0446  0.0829  0.1107  0.1982  0.2350
 0.51  0.80  1.11  1.92  1.99
 Openness *CredInfo -0.0229 -0.0323 -0.0387 -0.0608 -0.0694
-1.08 -1.31 -1.61 -2.49 -2.52
 Constant  2.3656  2.1854  2.1414  1.7102  1.7091
 5.86  4.75  5.19  3.70  2.98
 Number of obs.   137 137 137 137 137
 R
2  0.1225  0.1327  0.1368  0.1836  0.1375
B. Dependent variable: Log of Social Expenditure, OECD countries 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
 Log Openness  0.1320  0.4596  0.6824  1.9019  1.3438
 0.16  0.65  0.60  2.11  0.83
 LTV  -0.0001  0.0137  0.0320  0.0777  0.0433
-0.00  0.37  0.56  1.78  0.64
 Openness*LTV   0.0036  0.0002 -0.0038 -0.0178 -0.0110
 0.31  0.02 -0.25 -1.69 -0.69
 Constant  0.9479 -0.4411 -1.5015 -5.5660 -2.7498
 0.31 -0.16 -0.34 -1.51 -0.40
 Number of obs.   18 18 18 18 18
 R
2  0.6436  0.7751  0.6468  0.4234  0.3619
Notes: Robust t-statistic in italics. T
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